If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (17e7b4ac8a492915d8475c73488b64236250746de410c705b7cc43c0656589be)
package.json declares preinstall and postinstall hooks that invoke curl against a hardcoded bare-IP HTTP endpoint (http://64.227.183.144/depconf/abu-common-components/), sending the installer's username ($(whoami)), hostname ($(hostname)), current working directory ($PWD) and timestamp as query parameters. This fires automatically on `npm install` with no caller consent, leaks internal host and build-path identifiers in cleartext, and points at a non-publisher bare IP. The package itself is hollow — index.js is a one-line placeholder — and is published at the inflated version 99.99.1 by an anonymous author, the canonical shape of a dependency-confusion probe designed to be resolved ahead of a private internal package of the same name. The combination of the /depconf/<pkgname>/ URL path, the inflated version, and the placeholder body confirms reconnaissance intent: any organization with a private `abu-common-components` package will leak its existence and internal host fingerprints to the attacker on a single `npm install`.