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Medium 6.5
Hard-Coded Certificate and Private Key for HTTPS Web Interface in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
The certificate and private key used for providing transport layer security for connections to the web interface (TCP port 443) is hard-coded in the firmware and are shipped with the update files. An attacker can use the private key to perform man-in-the-midd…
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Medium 6.2
Backdoor Functionality via USB Drive in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
A USB backdoor feature can be triggered by attaching a USB drive that contains specially crafted "salia.ini" files. The .ini file can contain several "commands" that could be exploited by an attacker to export or modify the device configuration, enable an SSH…
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Medium 6.5
Hard-coded web interface credentials in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
There are several scripts in the web interface that are accessible via undocumented hard-coded credentials. The scripts provide access to additional administrative/debug functionality and are likely intended for debugging during development and provides an ad…
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Medium 6.5
OS Command Injection Vulnerability in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
Several OS command injection vulnerabilities exist in the device firmware in the /var/salia/mqtt.php script. By publishing a specially crafted message to a certain MQTT topic arbitrary OS commands can be executed with root permissions.
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Medium 6.5
Missing Authentication in eCharge Hardy Barth cPH2 / cPP2 charging stations
The devices do not implement any authentication for the web interface or the MQTT server. An attacker who has network access to the device immediately gets administrative access to the devices and can perform arbitrary administrative actions and reconfigure t…