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Medium 5.9
Denial of Service in Spring Batch FlatFileItemReader via Malformed Input File
Spring Batch's FlatFileItemReader supports files where a single logical record spans multiple physical lines — for example, a CSV field that contains embedded newlines wrapped in quotes. A specially crafted input file could exploit the way the reader assemble…
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Medium 5.6
Unsafe Java deserialization in DefaultExecutionContextSerializer without class allowlist
DefaultExecutionContextSerializer, used by default in Spring Batch's JDBC job repository, passes Base64-decoded bytes directly to ObjectInputStream.readObject() without an ObjectInputFilter that restricts types to a trusted class allowlist. Spring Batch 6.0.0…
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Medium 5.6
JobParameterDeserializer bypasses the trusted-type allowlist
Applications that deserialize execution contexts with Jackson2ExecutionContextStringSerializer are vulnerable to a deserialization attack if they use an untrusted data source for the job repository. The JobParameterDeserializer does not properly enforce the t…