Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/MADV_COLLAPSE: catch !none !huge !bad pmd lookups
In commit 34488399fa08 ("mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to
MADV_COLLAPSE") we make the following change to find_pmd_or_thp_or_none():
- if (!pmd_present(pmde))
- return SCAN_PMD_NULL;
+ if (pmd_none(pmde))
+ return SCAN_PMD_NONE;
This was for-use by MADV_COLLAPSE file/shmem codepaths, where
MADV_COLLAPSE might identify a pte-mapped hugepage, only to have
khugepaged race-in, free the pte table, and clear the pmd. Such codepaths
include:
A) If we find a suitably-aligned compound page of order HPAGE_PMD_ORDER
already in the pagecache.
B) In retract_page_tables(), if we fail to grab mmap_lock for the target
mm/address.
In these cases, collapse_pte_mapped_thp() really does expect a none (not
just !present) pmd, and we want to suitably identify that case separate
from the case where no pmd is found, or it's a bad-pmd (of course, many
things could happen once we drop mmap_lock, and the pmd could plausibly
undergo multiple transitions due to intervening fault, split, etc).
Regardless, the code is prepared install a huge-pmd only when the existing
pmd entry is either a genuine pte-table-mapping-pmd, or the none-pmd.
However, the commit introduces a logical hole; namely, that we've allowed
!none- && !huge- && !bad-pmds to be classified as genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmds. One such example that could leak through are swap
entries. The pmd values aren't checked again before use in
pte_offset_map_lock(), which is expecting nothing less than a genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmd.
We want to put back the !pmd_present() check (below the pmd_none() check),
but need to be careful to deal with subtleties in pmd transitions and
treatments by various arch.
The issue is that __split_huge_pmd_locked() temporarily clears the present
bit (or otherwise marks the entry as invalid), but pmd_present() and
pmd_trans_huge() still need to return true while the pmd is in this
transitory state. For example, x86's pmd_present() also checks the
_PAGE_PSE , riscv's version also checks the _PAGE_LEAF bit, and arm64 also
checks a PMD_PRESENT_INVALID bit.
Covering all 4 cases for x86 (all checks done on the same pmd value):
1) pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
All we actually know here is that the PSE bit is set. Either:
a) We aren't racing with __split_huge_page(), and PRESENT or PROTNONE
is set.
=> huge-pmd
b) We are currently racing with __split_huge_page(). The danger here
is that we proceed as-if we have a huge-pmd, but really we are
looking at a pte-mapping-pmd. So, what is the risk of this
danger?
The only relevant path is:
madvise_collapse() -> collapse_pte_mapped_thp()
Where we might just incorrectly report back "success", when really
the memory isn't pmd-backed. This is fine, since split could
happen immediately after (actually) successful madvise_collapse().
So, it should be safe to just assume huge-pmd here.
2) pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
Either:
a) PSE not set and either PRESENT or PROTNONE is.
=> pte-table-mapping pmd (or PROT_NONE)
b) devmap. This routine can be called immediately after
unlocking/locking mmap_lock -- or called with no locks held (see
khugepaged_scan_mm_slot()), so previous VMA checks have since been
invalidated.
3) !pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
Not possible.
4) !pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
Neither PRESENT nor PROTNONE set
=> not present
I've checked all archs that implement pmd_trans_huge() (arm64, riscv,
powerpc, longarch, x86, mips, s390) and this logic roughly translates
(though devmap treatment is unique to x86 and powerpc, and (3) doesn't
necessarily hold in general -- but that doesn't matter since
!pmd_present() always takes failure path).
Also, add a comment above find_pmd_or_thp_or_none()
---truncated---
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | 6.1 | 6.1.11 |
Fixed in Linux distributions
Distributions backport fixes, so the version that fixes this vulnerability differs per release — upgrade to at least the version shown. From the distributions' security trackers and advisories.
Debian
Security tracker ↗| Release | Package | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 14 | linux | 6.1.11-1 | — |
| Debian 13 | linux | 6.1.11-1 | — |
| Debian 12 | linux | 6.1.11-1 | — |
Ubuntu
Security tracker ↗| Release | Package | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTS | linux-realtime +1 | No fix yet | — |
| Ubuntu 22.04 LTS | linux-riscv +32 | No fix yet | — |
| Ubuntu 20.04 LTS | linux-gke +28 | No fix yet | — |
| Ubuntu 18.04 LTS | linux-gcp +14 | No fix yet | — |
| Ubuntu 16.04 LTS | linux-hwe-edge | No fix yet | — |
Red Hat
Security tracker ↗| Release | Package | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| RHEL 9 | bpftool | 7.3.0-427.13.1.el9_4 | RHSA-2024:2394 |
| RHEL 9 | rv +64 | 5.14.0-427.13.1.el9_4 | RHSA-2024:2394 |
Amazon Linux
| Release | Package | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amazon Linux 2023 | kernel-livepatch-6.1.12-17.42 | 1.0-0.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2023-132 |
| Amazon Linux 2023 | perf +12 | 6.1.12-17.42.amzn2023 | ALAS2023-2023-132 |
Advisories 3
- RHSA-2024:2394 Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security, bug fix, and enhancement update Red Hat Security Advisories (RHSA) · Oct 17, 2026
- WID-SEC-2025-0649 Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen BSI CERT-Bund (WID) · Sep 3, 2026
- ALAS2023-2023-132 Important: kernel security update (Amazon Linux 2023) Amazon Linux Security Center (ALAS) · Jun 5, 2025