Description
In DragonFly BSD through 6.4.2 before 4bb22ff, the ARP input handlers arpintr() and in_arpinput() (sys/netinet/if_ether.c) do not validate the hardware address length (ar_hln) and protocol address length (ar_pln) fields of incoming ARP packets. in_arpreply() then uses these attacker-controlled values as memcpy lengths when copying from kernel buffers that are only 6 and 4 bytes long, resulting in an out-of-bounds read of kernel heap and stack memory that is copied into the ARP reply sent back to the requester. An unauthenticated attacker on the adjacent network can use a single crafted ARP request to disclose up to roughly 250 bytes of each type of kernel memory, including kernel pointers. This is expected to be fixed in the 6.6 stable release when that is available.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| DragonFlyBSD | DragonFlyBSD | — | — |
Public exploits
Exploit or proof-of-concept code for this vulnerability is publicly available, which lowers the bar for attackers. Treat it as a reason to patch sooner.
GitHub 2 repositories
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ashrafzaryouh/CVE-2026-110912 ★ 2 · Oct 15, 2026
CVE-2026-110912
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dreamfast/CVE-2026-110912 ★ 0 · Oct 15, 2026
A PoC for CVE-2026-110912 'arpbleed'
Sources: PoC-in-GitHub, Metasploit Framework, Exploit-DB — updated daily. Only links are listed; no exploit code is hosted here.