AG2: Newline injection in SandboxShellTool bypasses allowed=[...] and readonly=True, enabling arbitrary command execution

AG2 is an open-source AgentOS. From 0.13.2 until ag2 1.1.1, and from autogen 0.13.2 to 0.14.1, SandboxShellTool configurations using allowed=[...] or readonly=True rely on ShellAdapter._filter and contains_shell_operator in ag2/tools/sandbox/filter.py and ag2/tools/sandbox/adapter/shell.py to validate a command prefix and reject selected shell syntax. The filter omits newline and carriage-return separators, while the accepted raw string is passed to sh -c, allowing an attacker-influenced agent command to execute an additional arbitrary statement. With the default LocalEnvironment backend, the injected statement runs as a host subprocess with the privileges of the agent process and can affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This issue is fixed in ag2 version 1.1.1.