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Medium · 5.5 CVE-2026-17534 EUVD-2026-49134GHSA-28vq-345c-25gg

Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects

Published Jul 27, 2026 · Updated Jul 27, 2026 · Assigned by JFROG

Description

Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.

Affected products

VendorProductAffectedFixed
MoonshotAI Kimi Code < 0.27.0 0.27.0

References