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OpenAdvisories
High · 7.1 CVE-2026-53604 EUVD-2026-71717GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5GO-2026-5984

nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths

Published Sep 4, 2026 · Updated Sep 8, 2026 · Assigned by GitHub_M

Description

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.

Affected products

VendorProductAffectedFixed
forgekeep nebula-mesh < 0.3.8 —

Fixed in Linux distributions

Distributions backport fixes, so the version that fixes this vulnerability differs per release — upgrade to at least the version shown. From the distributions' security trackers and advisories.

ReleasePackageFixed inAdvisory
openSUSE Leap 16.0 govulncheck-vulndb 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1 openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixedRecord
Go github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh < 0.3.8 0.3.8 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5

Advisories 1

References