Description
The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.
Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Docker | Docker Desktop | 4.56.0 – < 4.71.0 | 4.71.0 |
Public exploits
Exploit or proof-of-concept code for this vulnerability is publicly available, which lowers the bar for attackers. Treat it as a reason to patch sooner.
GitHub 1 repository
-
davidrxchester/CVE-2026-5843 ★ 0 · May 20, 2026
Docker Container Escape POC via mlx-metal importlib
Sources: PoC-in-GitHub, Metasploit Framework, Exploit-DB — updated daily. Only links are listed; no exploit code is hosted here.
Advisories 1
- WID-SEC-2026-1662 Docker Desktop Model Runner: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Codeausführung BSI CERT-Bund (WID) · May 25, 2026
References
- https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4710 release-notes