Description
XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --> is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the <!-- and --> delimiters.
When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector.
This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| qcam | saxy | 0.7.0 – < 1.7.0 | 1.7.0 |
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | saxy | >= 0.7.0, < 1.7.0 | 1.7.0 | EEF-CVE-2026-66293 |
References
- https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-mm3m-xwmf-v698 vendor-advisory related
- EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-66293 related
- OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-66293 related
- Introducing commit 7266632 in qcam/saxy related
- Fix commit 6d12ee1 in qcam/saxy patch