Description
AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| ash-project | ash_ai | 0.1.0 – < 1.0.3 | 1.0.3 |
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | ash_ai | >= 0.1.0, < 1.0.3 | 1.0.3 | EEF-CVE-2026-78230 |
References
- GHSA-v5rw-36x5-r5vx vendor-advisory
- EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-78230 related
- OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-78230 related
- Introducing commit 2ba234b in ash-project/ash_ai related
- Fix commit 9c02de5 in ash-project/ash_ai patch