scsi: core: Validate MODE SENSE lengths in scsi_cdl_enable()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: core: Validate MODE SENSE lengths in scsi_cdl_enable()

scsi_cdl_enable() uses length fields returned by MODE SENSE to locate
the ATA feature mode page in a 64-byte stack buffer. A target can report
a total length shorter than its mode header and block descriptors. The
unsigned subtraction used for the MODE SELECT length can wrap, and the
separately computed buf_data can point beyond buf.

During automatic scan, enable is false, so the read-modify-write of
buf_data[4] can clear the low two bits of a target-selected
out-of-bounds stack byte. scsi_mode_select() can then copy up to 64
bytes from outside the buffer into the outgoing MODE SELECT payload,
disclosing stack contents to the target.

This is reachable while scanning a USB storage device that identifies as
an ATA device and advertises CDL support. No filesystem mount or
userspace access to the block device is required.

On upstream commit cee9395acd80 ("Linux 7.3-rc1"), a build-specific,
one-vCPU QEMU/Raw Gadget proof using QEMU-only multi-UDC allocator
sampling executed a fixed proof command inside the guest and created a
UID-0-owned marker during automatic enumeration, with KASLR and NX
enabled.

The issue was independently found during security research at Drivesec
S.r.l.

Cap the available length to the buffer size. Validate and consume the
mode header and block descriptor lengths before using the page, and
require the five bytes needed to access the CDL field.