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Unscored CVE-2026-99561 EUVD-2026-130285GHSA-7qq5-73rh-j698

fork: don't create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set

Published Nov 19, 2026 · Assigned by Linux

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fork: don't create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set

zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set.
Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can't
catch it anymore. It isn't counted in core_state->threads_remaining and
it isn't sent SIGKILL.

do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls
io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task
work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates
a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in
the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being
dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it
exits it sees signal->core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and
decrements threads_remaining like any other thread.

So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves
coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running.

The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately
didn't send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn't
have PF_SIGNALED either.

Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP.
That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever
gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn't retry -EINTR.

Clearing PF_POSTCOREDUMP for the new thread in copy_process() was the
other option. It makes the worker a thread like any other, but it only
helps while the dump hasn't started. A worker born after zap_process()
has run is invisible to it whatever its flags say and still decrements
threads_remaining on the way out. Refusing to create it covers both, and
then no task is ever born with the flag, so there is nothing to clear.

Moving io_uring_files_cancel() ahead of synchronize_group_exit() closes
the same window. It runs the cancellation, and whatever that can block
on, before the thread announces itself to the dumper. A thread that
blocks there never reaches coredump_task_exit() at all, so the dumper
ends up waiting for a thread that never parks. Refusing the creation
leaves the cancellation where it is. But it's very ugly to run io_uring
work even before we did all the generic exit work.

Affected products

VendorProductAffectedFixed
Linux Linux 5.16 6.12.117

Fixed in Linux distributions

Distributions backport fixes, so the version that fixes this vulnerability differs per release — upgrade to at least the version shown. From the distributions' security trackers and advisories.

ReleasePackageFixed inAdvisory
Debian 14 linux 7.2.15-1 —
Debian 13 linux 6.12.117-1 —
Debian 12 linux No fix yet —

Azure Linux

ReleasePackageFixed inAdvisory
Azure Linux 3 kernel No fix yet —

Advisories 1

References