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Medium GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g

zaino-state has a Non-Finalized State Reorg — No Cycle Detection or Depth Limit

Published Jul 31, 2026 · Updated Jul 31, 2026 · Assigned by GHSA

Description

### Summary
`NonFinalizedState::handle_reorg` is a recursive, unbounded async function that traverses parent blocks until it finds a common ancestor on the main chain. It has **no recursion depth limit** and **no cycle detection**. A malicious or buggy validator can serve a block whose `previous_block_hash` points back to itself (or forms a cycle with other blocks), causing `handle_reorg` to infinite-loop, consuming 100% CPU and never making sync progress. Additionally, `update()` contains an `.expect("empty snapshot impossible")` that panics if the non-finalized snapshot becomes empty after trimming finalized blocks.

### Details

**Location:** `packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:443-489`

```rust
async fn handle_reorg(
&self,
working_snapshot: &mut NonfinalizedBlockCacheSnapshot,
block: &impl Block,
) -> Result<IndexedBlock, SyncError> {
let prev_block = match working_snapshot
.get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order())
.cloned()
{
Some(prev_block) => {
if !working_snapshot
.heights_to_hashes
.values()
.any(|hash| hash == prev_block.hash())
{
Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &prev_block)).await? // <-- LINE 459
} else {
prev_block
}
}
None => {
let prev_block = self
.source
.get_block(HashOrHeight::Hash(
zebra_chain::block::Hash::from_bytes_in_serialized_order(
block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order(),
),
))
.await
.map_err(|e| { ... })?
.ok_or(SyncError::ValidatorConnectionError(...))?;
Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &*prev_block)).await? // <-- LINE 483
}
};
let indexed_block = block.to_indexed_block(&prev_block, self).await?;
working_snapshot.add_block_new_chaintip(indexed_block.clone());
Ok(indexed_block)
}
```

**Infinite loop via self-referencing block:**
1. A compromised validator serves a block `B` where `B.prev_hash == B.hash`.
2. `handle_reorg` is called with `B`.
3. `get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(B.prev_hash)` finds `B` itself in `working_snapshot.blocks`.
4. Check: is `B.hash` in `working_snapshot.heights_to_hashes`? If `B` is a new chaintip not yet on the main chain, **no**.
5. Recurse with `prev_block` = `B` (the exact same block).
6. This repeats forever. The async recursion builds a new `Box::pin` future each iteration, consuming heap memory and CPU.

**Stack exhaustion via deep reorg:**
A deep reorg of >1000 blocks would recurse >1000 times. Each async recursion creates a new `Box::pin` future on the heap. While this won't exhaust the native stack immediately, it will allocate unbounded heap memory and CPU time, effectively DoS-ing the sync task.

**`.expect("empty snapshot impossible")` panic:**

**Location:** `packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:543-548`

```rust
new_snapshot.remove_finalized_blocks(finalized_height);
let best_block = &new_snapshot
.blocks
.values()
.max_by_key(|block| block.chainwork())
.cloned()
.expect("empty snapshot impossible"); // <-- LINE 548
```

If `finalized_height` is greater than or equal to all blocks in `new_snapshot.blocks`, `remove_finalized_blocks` retains only blocks at or above that height. If none exist, `new_snapshot.blocks` becomes empty. The `.expect()` then panics. While the comment claims this is "impossible," defensive programming dictates it is reachable under corruption or edge-case sync conditions.

### PoC

1. Run a regtest.
2. Serve a block where `header.previous_block_hash == block.hash()`.
3. Zaino's `NonFinalizedState::sync` enters `handle_reorg` and infinite-loops.
4. Sync never completes. CPU usage pegs to 100%. No new blocks are served to clients.

### Fix

1. **Add an explicit recursion depth limit** (e.g., max 1000 iterations) and return `SyncError::ReorgFailure` if exceeded:
```rust
const MAX_REORG_DEPTH: usize = 1000;
```
2. **Track visited hashes** in a `HashSet<BlockHash>` during traversal to detect cycles and abort with an error.
3. **Replace `.expect("empty snapshot impossible")`** with a proper `Err(UpdateError::DatabaseHole)` or similar error return.

### Additional Attack Vectors

- **Deep reorg DoS:** A miner with significant hash power (or a compromised validator) triggers a deep reorg. Zaino spends excessive CPU and memory in `handle_reorg`, starving the async runtime and stalling response serving.
- **Fork-choice manipulation:** By serving cyclic or very deep sidechains, an attacker can keep Zaino stuck in reorg handling indefinitely, preventing it from ever serving the real best chain.

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixedRecord
crates.io zaino-state < 0.4.1 0.4.1 GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g

References