Skip to content
OpenAdvisories
Low GHSA-6hxq-p678-4hr2

SimpleWebAuthn: Registration verification does not sufficiently ensure that attestation certificates chain to a trust anchor

Published Sep 4, 2026 · Updated Sep 4, 2026 · Assigned by GHSA

Description

## Summary
`validateCertificatePath()` does not verify that an attestation's certificate chain actually terminates at a configured trust anchor. When walking the chain it stops at the first self-signed certificate it finds (which could be user-supplied), and exits early.

This happens before the configured Apple/Google/etc trust anchor (which is concatenated to the end of the chain) is reached.

A user can therefore register a credential and have the server accept it as if it were backed by a genuine Apple / Android SafetyNet / Yubikey / etc.

## Details
`packages/server/src/helpers/validateCertificatePath.ts`:

The configured trust anchor is appended to the end of the untrusted chain (line **83**):

```ts
const x5cWithTrustAnchor = x5cCertsParsed.concat([anchor]);
```

The walk then verifies each cert was signed by the next, but breaks on the first self-signed cert (lines **104–116**):

```ts
if (issuer.subject === issuer.issuer) {
// Root cert detected, make sure it signed itself
const issuerSignedIssuer = await issuer.verify(
{ publicKey: issuer.publicKey, signatureOnly: true },
WebCrypto,
);
if (!issuerSignedIssuer) {
throw new InvalidSubjectAndIssuer();
}
break; // <-- exits before the appended trust anchor is ever checked if user supplied self-signed cert comes first
}
```

The success condition is therefore "the certs form an internally-consistent chain ending in some self-signed cert" Rather than "the chain terminates at one of the configured trust anchors."

## Exploit shape

```
attacker sends: x5c = [ forgedLeaf (signed by attacker root),
attackerSelfSignedRoot ]

library builds: [ forgedLeaf, attackerSelfSignedRoot, <configured Apple/Google/etc root> ]

walk: forgedLeaf -> attackerSelfSignedRoot (verifies, attacker controls both)
attackerSelfSignedRoot is self-signed -> break
attackerSelfSignedRoot -> configured root (NEVER CHECKED)
```

`return true`. The configured anchor never gets checked.

As far as observed, all attestation enforcement uses validateCertificatePath when using MDS etc.

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixedRecord
npm @simplewebauthn/server < 13.3.2 13.3.2 GHSA-6hxq-p678-4hr2

References