Description
### Impact
`skilo add` installs a skill by recursively copying the skill directory into the
target skills directory. The copy routine (`copy_dir_all`) classified each entry
with `std::fs::DirEntry::file_type()` — which does **not** follow symlinks — and
then copied non-directory entries with `std::fs::copy()`, which **does**
dereference symlinks.
As a result, a skill containing a symbolic link such as
`reference.txt -> /home/<user>/.ssh/id_rsa` was copied as a regular file whose
contents are the link's **target**. A malicious skill source — for example a git
repository installed via `skilo add github.com/<attacker>/<skills>`, or a local
path — could read arbitrary files readable by the user running `skilo add` (SSH
keys, cloud credentials, `.env` files, etc.) and place their contents inside the
installed skill directory, where the user or their agent may later read, share,
or sync them.
This is arbitrary local file disclosure (CWE-59 / CWE-61, symlink following)
triggered by installing an untrusted skills source.
### Patches
Fixed in **0.11.1**. `copy_dir_all` now rejects symbolic-link entries at any
recursion depth (failing closed with a dedicated error) instead of dereferencing
them.
### Workarounds
- Only install skills from sources you trust.
- Inspect a skill source for symbolic links before running `skilo add`.
### Affected versions
Introduced together with the `skilo add` command in 0.5.0 and present through
0.11.0. Releases before 0.5.0 do not include the `add` command.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | skilo | >= 0.5.0, < 0.11.1 | 0.11.1 | GHSA-6xx4-9wp6-65p7 |
References
- https://github.com/manuelmauro/skilo/security/advisories/GHSA-6xx4-9wp6-65p7 web
- https://github.com/manuelmauro/skilo/pull/11 web
- https://github.com/manuelmauro/skilo/commit/c14bdc2eddcf26633ab1dcc0b2d5c0ff42c72a3e web
- https://github.com/manuelmauro/skilo package
- https://github.com/manuelmauro/skilo/releases/tag/v0.11.1 web