Description
## Summary
Flowise on current `main` allows an authenticated user with
`documentStores:preview-process` permission to trigger the `S3 Directory`
document loader with attacker-controlled S3 object keys. The loader joins
each returned S3 key with a temporary directory using `path.join(tempDir, key)`
and writes the object bytes to disk **without validating traversal sequences
such as `../`**. Cleanup later removes only the original temporary directory,
so files written outside that directory persist on the host filesystem.
This yields **arbitrary file write** with the privileges of the Flowise
server process.
A related variant exists in the `S3File` loader when
`fileProcessingMethod = unstructured` (same root cause; its cleanup behavior
turns it into a mixed arbitrary write/delete/DoS primitive).
## Affected component
- `packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3Directory/S3Directory.ts`
- line **191**: `filePath = path.join(tempDir, key)` (unsanitized)
- line **213**: recursive `mkdirSync` creates parent path
- line **216**: `writeFileSync` writes attacker-controlled bytes
- line **289**: cleanup only removes the original `tempDir`, so escaped
files remain on disk
- Related (variant):
`packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3File/S3File.ts`
(lines 756, 780, 782, 817 — arbitrary write + recursive dirname delete)
## Reachability
- Routes exposed:
`packages/server/src/routes/documentstore/index.ts:41,45`
(`/api/v1/document-store/loader/preview`,
`/api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId`)
- Both require `documentStores:preview-process`
- `packages/server/src/services/documentstore/index.ts:588` passes
`data.loaderConfig` straight to the loader node **with no path
sanitization**
- `S3Directory` accepts a custom `serverUrl`, so the attacker does **not
need access to an existing trusted AWS bucket** — they can point Flowise
at a local MinIO or any S3-compatible endpoint they control
## Impact
- Authenticated arbitrary file write to any path writable by the Flowise
process
- Destructive overwrite of application data, secrets, or configuration
- Deployment-dependent lift to RCE if the service account can modify
executable, startup, or interpreter-loaded files
(e.g. `.bashrc`, systemd units, cron files, `require.resolve` targets,
`package.json` postinstall scripts). This is not guaranteed
product-wide.
## Preconditions
- Flowise instance running (HTTP server mode)
- Attacker has a workspace account with the
`documentStores:preview-process` role
- No additional infrastructure required — `serverUrl` can point to
attacker-controlled S3-compatible endpoint
## Proof of Concept
1. Authenticate as a user with `documentStores:preview-process`
2. Run an S3-compatible server the attacker controls (e.g. MinIO)
3. Create an object with a traversal key such as:
`../../../../tmp/flowise-poc.txt`
4. Trigger:
POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/preview
(or /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId)
body: {
"loaderId": "s3Directory",
"loaderConfig": {
"serverUrl": "http://attacker-minio:9000",
"bucketName": "attacker-bucket",
"prefix": "",
"credential": ""
}
}
5. Observe that Flowise writes the object bytes to the escaped path
6. Observe that cleanup removes only the original temp directory; the
escaped file persists
Local reproduction confirmed: writing a key containing
`../../escape-target/poc.txt` from a nested temp root created the file
outside the temp directory, and the cleanup removed only `tempDir`.
## Root Cause
The loader trusts S3 object keys as safe local relative paths. It should
canonicalize the destination with `path.resolve(...)`, verify the resolved
path remains within the intended temp directory, and reject traversal or
absolute-path patterns before any directory creation or file write.
## Suggested Remediation
The repository already has shared path validators that are not used here:
- `packages/components/src/validator.ts:35` defines traversal checks
- `packages/components/src/validator.ts:295` defines `sanitizeFileName`
Recommended fix:
1. Replace `path.join(tempDir, key)` with a resolve-and-verify flow
2. Reject any resolved path outside `tempDir`
3. Prefer a sanitized basename if directory structure is not required
4. Apply the same fix to the `S3File` loader (`fileProcessingMethod = unstructured` branch)
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm | flowise | < 3.1.3 | 3.1.3 | GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf |
| npm | flowise-components | < 3.1.3 | 3.1.3 | GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf |
References
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf web
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6549 web
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/571b5d6218b1c129588ac625c8f20e30905a67cb web
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise package
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3 web