Description
### Impact
Cilium allows outside actors (`world` entity) to directly access pods with their internal pod IP, even if they are not exposed explicitly (e.g. via `LoadBalancer`). A pod that does not authenticate clients and that does not exclude `world` traffic via network policy may leak sensitive data to an attacker _inside the cloud VPC_.
### Patches
The issue has been patched in [v2.16.3](https://github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/releases/tag/v2.16.3).
### Workarounds
This network policy excludes all `world` traffic. It mitigates the problem, but will also block all desired external traffic. If vulnerable pods are known, a policy can be crafted to only firewall those instead (see also https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/policy/language/#access-to-from-outside-cluster).
```yaml
apiVersion: "cilium.io/v2"
kind: CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: "from-world-to-role-public"
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels: {}
# role: public
ingressDeny:
- fromEntities:
- world
```
### References
The tracking bug for a Cilium-side fix is https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues/25626.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/edgelesssys/constellation | all versions | — | GO-2024-2727 |
| Go | github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2 | < 2.16.3 | 2.16.3 | GHSA-g8fc-vrcg-8vjg |