Description
`internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245` — the `enrollment_tokens.token` column holds the raw UUID token. `ConsumeToken` does `WHERE token = ?` against the raw string. Compare with `operator_api_keys.key_hash`, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in `internal/api/middleware.go:51-53`).
## Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.0.
## Threat model
Read access to `nebula-mgmt.db`: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens — which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host's identity — are not.
An attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent's intended Nebula identity.
## Suggested fix
1. Schema migration: rename `enrollment_tokens.token` → `token_hash` (or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows).
2. Store SHA-256 of token on create:
```go
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
```
3. `ConsumeToken` accepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed.
Side bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from `uuid.New().String()` (122 bits) to `hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes)` (256 bits), matching the project's session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in.
TOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (`internal/web/totp.go:74-78`) — confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/juev/nebula-mesh | < 0.3.2 | 0.3.2 | GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf |