Description
The NIP-44 v2 decryption path in the `nostr` crate contains a reachable panic
when processing a short or empty ciphertext. After the HMAC check passes and the
ciphertext is decrypted via ChaCha20, the code reads a 2‑byte unpadded‑length
prefix via `buffer[0..2]` without first verifying that the decrypted buffer
contains at least 2 bytes. A malicious sender who holds the symmetric
conversation key (e.g., a direct‑message sender) can craft a payload that
produces a 0 or 1‑byte decrypted buffer, causing an index‑out‑of‑bounds panic.
This can be triggered remotely through any relay that delivers the crafted
event to the victim's client, resulting in a denial of service. No key material,
plaintext, or memory corruption occurs.
The vulnerability is present in all versions from `0.26.0` up to `0.44.4`
(inclusive) and in the alpha releases `0.45.0‑alpha.1` through `0.45.0‑alpha.4`.
Versions `0.44.5` and `0.45.0‑alpha.5` contain the fix.
## Credit
Discovered and responsibly disclosed by **Muhammed Shekho** ([mhd-shekho.com](https://mhd-shekho.com)).
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | nostr | >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.44.5 · >= 0.45.0-alpha.1, < 0.45.0-alpha.5 | 0.44.5, 0.45.0-alpha.5 | RUSTSEC-2026-0216 |