Description
### Summary
In `openclaw` MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by `uploadId` alone. `fileConsent/invoke` did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload.
### Impact
An attacker who obtained a valid `uploadId` within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path).
### Technical Details
- Pending uploads stored `conversationId`, but invoke handling consumed by `uploadId` only.
- The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before `uploadToConsentUrl(...)` and pending-upload removal.
- Fix binds accept/decline handling to normalized conversation id match before consuming pending upload state.
### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Latest published npm version (as of February 26, 2026): `2026.2.24`
- Vulnerable range: `<= 2026.2.24`
- Patched in release: `2026.2.25`
### Remediation
Upgrade to `openclaw` `2026.2.25` (or later) once published.
### Fix Commit(s)
- `347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1`
### Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | < 2026.2.25 | 2026.2.25 | GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf |