Description
## Summary
FileBrowser Quantum serves inline SVG files without a `Content-Security-Policy` header, allowing embedded JavaScript in SVG files to execute when accessed via public share links.
Verified on v1.3.0-stable.
## Affected product
- **Product:** FileBrowser Quantum (`gtsteffaniak/filebrowser`)
- **Verified version:** v1.3.0-stable
- **Docker image:** gtstef/filebrowser:latest
- **Affected endpoint:** `GET /public/api/resources/download?hash=HASH&inline=true`
- **CWE:** CWE-79 — Cross-site Scripting (Stored)
## Impact
- **Stored XSS** — Malicious SVG persists and executes for every visitor to the share link
- **No authentication required to trigger** — Public share links are accessible to anyone
- **Session hijacking** — If authenticated users click the link, their session can be stolen
- **Phishing** — Attacker can redirect or overlay fake login forms
## Reproduction
1. Login as any user with upload permission
2. Upload SVG file:
```xml
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>
</svg>
```
3. Create public share for the file
4. Access the share link with `?inline=true`
5. JavaScript executes in browser
## Root cause
The inline download endpoint returns SVG files with:
```
Content-Type: image/svg+xml
Content-Disposition: inline; filename="xss.svg"
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
```
But no CSP header to block script execution. The upstream project (filebrowser/filebrowser) mitigates this with:
```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'none'
```
## Suggested fix
Add CSP header on inline file downloads:
```go
w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "script-src 'none'")
```
This matches the upstream filebrowser/filebrowser implementation.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser | < 0.0.0-20260501184955-6bfc3974192e | 0.0.0-20260501184955-6bfc3974192e | GHSA-mmpx-jh39-wrv6 |