Description
The limit on memory used to buffer outgoing datagrams, introduced in 0.11.17, subtracted an
evicted datagram's size from the buffered byte counter twice when `Datagrams::send` was called
with `drop = true` (as `Connection::send_datagram` in the `quinn` crate does) while the buffer was
full. Under sustained eviction the counter drifts below its true value: debug builds panic with an
integer underflow, while release builds wrap the counter, drain the whole queue, and then panic on
a desynchronization check in a later `send` call. In `quinn`, this panic occurs while the
connection lock is held, poisoning it and causing a double panic (and thus an abort) when the
connection is dropped.
This can be triggered without a malicious peer, by an application that sends a burst of datagrams
and then idles. It can also be triggered by a peer that keeps the connection alive with PING frames
while withholding acknowledgements, so that the sender's congestion window stays closed and the
outgoing queue never drains. Applications that use `send_datagram_wait` are not affected.
Only 0.11.17 is affected; the flaw was corrected in 0.11.18 by removing the redundant subtraction.
Thanks to [@alexpyattaev](https://github.com/alexpyattaev) for reporting and
[@vcarus](https://github.com/vcarus) for fixing this issue.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | quinn-proto | >= 0.11.17, < 0.11.18 | 0.11.18 | RUSTSEC-2026-0343 |