Description
### Impact
During recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest.
This allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference.
Under these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment.
This issue does **not** affect the following:
* secrets and state of the legitimate Coordinator instances
* integrity of workloads
* certificates chaining back to the legitimate Coordinator root certificate
### Patches
The issue has been patched in [`v1.7.0`](https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/releases/tag/v1.7.0).
### Workarounds
Connections that purely authenticate based on a known Coordinator's root certificate, e.g. the one retrieved when using the `marblerun manifest set` CLI command, are not affected.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun | < 1.7.0 | 1.7.0 | GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h |
References
- https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/security/advisories/GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h web
- https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/commit/e4864f9f1d0f12a4a7d28514da43bcc75603a5b5 web
- https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun package
- https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/releases/tag/v1.7.0 web
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3450 web