Description
## Summary
Embedded font-family names (`word/fontTable.xml`) were interpolated unescaped into an injected `@font-face` `<style>` and into the print window's `document.write()`. A crafted name injects page-wide CSS on open, and breaks out of `<style>`
into executable HTML on Print.
## Impact
Opening a crafted `.docx` applies attacker-controlled CSS page-wide with zero clicks (overlay/phishing, attribute-selector exfiltration of input values, tracking beacons). Clicking Print escalates to script execution in the embedder's origin.
## Remediation
Upgrade to 1.8.3. Font names are CSS-escaped before interpolation (quotes, backslash, `< >`, and CSS newlines), and the print window is assembled with DOM APIs instead of `document.write`.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @eigenpal/docx-editor-core | < 1.8.3 | 1.8.3 | GHSA-x7m8-jrm8-hpvx |
| npm | @eigenpal/docx-editor-react | < 1.8.3 | 1.8.3 | GHSA-x7m8-jrm8-hpvx |