Description
The `nostr` crate did not validate the length of the initialization vector
decoded from the `?iv=` portion of a NIP-04 encrypted message.
The decoded IV was converted from a byte slice to the 16-byte AES-CBC IV type
using a conversion that asserts the slice length. As a result, an IV whose
decoded length was not exactly 16 bytes caused a panic before ciphertext
decryption. For example, `?iv=AAAA` decodes to a three-byte IV and triggers the
panic.
Applications that decrypt untrusted NIP-04 content are affected. The issue is
also reachable through NIP-47 (Nostr Wallet Connect), where response and
notification events from a malicious or compromised wallet service are passed
to NIP-04 decryption. If the panic is not isolated, a crafted event can terminate
the application or disrupt message processing, causing a denial of service.
The issue does not affect confidentiality or integrity.
The flaw was corrected by converting the decoded IV to `[u8; 16]` using a
checked conversion. Invalid IV lengths now return a `Malformed` error instead of
panicking.
## Credit
Discovered and responsibly disclosed by **Muhammed Shekho** ([mhd-shekho.com](https://mhd-shekho.com)).
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | nostr | >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.44.6 · >= 0.45.0-alpha.1, < 0.45.0-alpha.6 | 0.44.6, 0.45.0-alpha.6 | RUSTSEC-2026-0219 |