5 results · Feed
-
High 8.8
ZeptoClaw: Path boundary checks bypass via symlink, TOCTOU, and hardlink
ZeptoClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 0.7.6, there is a Dangling Symlink Component Bypass, TOCTOU Between Validation and Use, and Hardlink Alias Bypass. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.6.
-
High 8.2
ZeptoClaw: Generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields; allowlist is checked against untrusted payload data
ZeptoClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 0.7.6, the generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chat_id) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and…
-
Medium 6.5
ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation
### Summary The email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed `From` header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have…
-
Critical 10.0
zeptoclaw has Shell allowlist-blocklist bypass via command/argument injection and file name wildcards
### Summary [zeptoclaw](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw) implements a allowlist combined with a blocklist to prevent malicious shell commands in [src/security/shell.rs](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/blob/v0.5.8/src/security/shell.rs). However, even in t…
-
High 7.5
zeptoclaw has Android device shell blocklist bypass via argument permutation
### Summary [zeptoclaw](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw) implements a [blocklist](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/blob/fe2ef07cfec5bb46b42cdd65f52b9230c03e9270/src/tools/android/actions.rs#L413-L424) to prevent dangerous commands running in android device…