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OpenAdvisories

Product · Alex Tselegidis

easyappointments

8 known vulnerabilities.

easyappointments at a glance

Last 12 months
8
Critical · all time
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8 results · Feed

  • High 8.2

    Easy!Appointments through 1.6.0 Authorization Bypass via booking/register Endpoint

    Easy!Appointments through 1.6.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in Booking::register() that allows unauthenticated attackers to modify any appointment by supplying an appointment id without its hash. Attackers can enumerate sequential appointme…

  • High 7.1

    Easy!Appointments Vulnerable to Appointments Takeover via Excessive Data Exposure

    Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In version 1.5.2, an Excessive Data Exposure vulnerability in the customers search endpoint allows an authenticated user to obtain appointment hashes belonging to other users. Using these hashes, an at…

  • Low 3.1

    Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync

    Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token ag…

  • Low 2.7

    Easy!Appointments has server-side request forgery in CalDAV connection test that exposes the deployment's internal network

    Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Caldav::connect_to_server` at `application/controllers/Caldav.php:60` hands the request's `caldav_url` to a Guzzle `REPORT` call without scheme or host validation. A logged…

  • Low 3.3

    Easy!Appointments appointments/store and appointments/update allow cross-provider appointment injection — Authorization Bypass

    Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. Versions prior to 1.6.0 correctly filter provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutati…

  • Low 2.6

    Easy!Appointments disable_booking_message rendered as raw HTML on public booking page — Stored XSS

    Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. Versions prior to 1.6.0 allow administrators to define a custom "booking disabled" message through the booking settings page. That value is stored in the `disable_booking_message` setting via a rich-te…

  • Medium 6.9

    Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page

    Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions up to and including 1.5.2, the booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the entire customer record as inline Java…

  • High 7.4

    CSRF Protection Bypass: Sensitive endpoints accept GET requests, enabling admin account takeover

    Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In 1.5.2 and earlier, application/core/EA_Security.php::csrf_verify() only enforces CSRF for POST requests and returns early for non-POST methods. Several application endpoints perform state-changing o…