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Vendor

Mobile Industrial Robots A/S

12 known vulnerabilities.

Mobile Industrial Robots A/S at a glance

Last 12 months
0
Critical · all time
7
Exploited · all time
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Products

12 results · Feed

  • Critical 10.0

    RVD#2569: Insecure operating system defaults in MiR robots

    MiR robot controllers (central computation unit) makes use of Ubuntu 16.04.2 an operating system, Thought for desktop uses, this operating system presents insecure defaults for robots. These insecurities include a way for users to escalate their access beyond…

  • High 8.2

    RVD#2568: Apache server is vulnerable to a DoS

    The Apache server on port 80 that host the web interface is vulnerable to a DoS by spamming incomplete HTTP headers, effectively blocking the access to the dashboard.

  • Critical 9.8

    RVD#2566: Hardcoded Credentials on MiRX00 wireless Access Point

    One of the wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and possibly (according to the vendor) other MiR fleet vehicles comes pre-configured in WiFi Master (Access Point) mode. Credentials to such wireless Access Point default to well known and widely spread SSI…

  • Critical 9.8

    RVD#2565: Weak token generation for the REST API.

    The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived from the publicly available default credentials for the web interface. Given a USERNAME and a PASSWORD, the token string is generated directly with base64(USERNAME:sha256(PASSWORD)). An unauthorized atta…

  • High 7.5

    RVD#2560: Unprotected intellectual property in Mobile Industrial Robots (MiR) controllers

    MiR controllers across firmware versions 2.8.1.1 and before do not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed in the robots. This flaw allows attackers with access to the robot or the robot network (while in combination with o…

  • Medium 6.1

    RVD#2561: Unprotected BIOS allows user to boot from live OS image.

    The BIOS onboard MiR's Computer is not protected by password, therefore, it allows a Bad Operator to modify settings such as boot order. This can be leveraged by a Malicious operator to boot from a Live Image.

  • Medium 6.4

    RVD#2562: Booting from a live image leads to exfiltration of sensible information and privilege escalation

    There is no mechanism in place to prevent a bad operator to boot from a live OS image, this can lead to extraction of sensible files (such as the shadow file) or privilege escalation by manually adding a new user with sudo privileges on the machine.

  • Critical 9.8

    RVD#2557: Hardcoded Credentials on MiRX00 Control Dashboard

    Out of the wired and wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and other vehicles from the MiR fleet, it's possible to access the Control Dashboard on a hardcoded IP address. Credentials to such wireless interface default to well known and widely spread users…

  • Critical 9.8

    RVD#2558: Default credentials on SICK PLC allows disabling safety features

    The password for the safety PLC is the default and thus easy to find (in manuals, etc.). This allows a manipulated program to be uploaded to the safety PLC, effectively disabling the emergency stop in case an object is too close to the robot. Navigation and a…

  • Critical 10.0

    RVD#2555: MiR ROS computational graph is exposed to all network interfaces, including poorly secured wireless networks and open wired ones

    MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph to all network interfaces, wireless and wired. This is the result of a bad set up and can be mitigated by appropriately configuring ROS …

  • High 7.1

    RVD#2556: MiR REST API allows for data exfiltration by unauthorized attackers (e.g. indoor maps)

    The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived (sha256 and base64 encoding) from the publicly available default credentials from the Control Dashboard (refer to CVE-2020-10270 for related flaws). This flaw in combination with CVE-2020-10273 allows an…

  • Critical 10.0

    RVD#2554: MiR ROS computational graph presents no authentication mechanisms

    MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph without any sort of authentication. This allows attackers with access to the internal wireless and wired networks to take control of the…