shared_preferences_android vulnerability

### Impact
Due to some data types not being natively representable for the available storage options, shared_preferences_android serializes and deserializes special string prefixes to store these unrepresentable data types. This allows arbitrary classes to be deserialized leading to arbitrary code execution.

As a result, Files containing the preferences can be overwritten with a malicious one with a deserialization payload that triggers as soon as the data is loaded from the disk.

### Patches
2.3.4

### Workarounds
Update to the latest version of shared_preferences_android that contains the changes to address this vulnerability.

### References
TBD

### For more information
See [our community page](https://dart.dev/community) to find ways to contact the team.

### Thanks
Thank you so much to Oskar Zeino-Mahmalat from sonarsource for finding and reporting this issue!