Description
### Summary
Usage of the `Butterfly.prototype.parseJSON` or `getJSON` functions on an attacker-controlled crafted input string allows the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on the server.
Since Butterfly JavaScript code has access to Java classes, it can run arbitrary programs.
### Details
The `parseJSON` function (edu/mit/simile/butterfly/Butterfly.js:64) works by calling `eval`, an approach that goes back to the original library by Crockford, before JSON was part of the ECMAScript language. It uses a regular expression to remove strings from the input, then checks that there are no unexpected characters in the non-string remainder.
However, the regex is imperfect, as was [discovered earlier by Mike Samuel](https://dev.to/mikesamuel/2008-silently-securing-jsonparse-5cbb); specifically, the "cleaner" can be tricked into treating part of the input as a string that the "evaluator" does not, because of a difference in interpretation regarding the [the Unicode zero-width joiner character](https://unicode-explorer.com/c/200D). Representing that character with a visible symbol, a malicious input looks like:
```js
"\�\", Packages.java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec('gnome-calculator')) // "
```
This is understood...
* by `JSON_cleaning_RE` as a single string, and because it is a string it can be collapsed to nothing, which is not problematic, so the original input proceeds to `eval`.
* by the `eval` function, which ignores zero-width joiners entirely, as a string containing a single escaped backslash, followed by a comma, then a function call, closing parenthesis, and finally a line comment.
The function call is evaluated, and a calculator is opened.
Possible mitigations and additional defenses could include:
* Replacing the JSON implementation with Rhino's built-in implementation.
* Dropping all JSON-related and JSONP-related code entirely.
* Restricting the access the JavaScript controller code has to the rest of the system by using `initSafeStandardObjects` instead of `initStandardObjects`, using `setClassShutter`, and so on.
### PoC
Change OpenRefine `core` `controller.js` to add a call to the vulnerable `getJSON` function:
```diff
diff --git a/main/webapp/modules/core/MOD-INF/controller.js b/main/webapp/modules/core/MOD-INF/controller.js
index 4ceba0676..1ce0936d2 100644
--- a/main/webapp/modules/core/MOD-INF/controller.js
+++ b/main/webapp/modules/core/MOD-INF/controller.js
@@ -631,0 +632,5 @@ function process(path, request, response) {
+ if (path == "getjsontest") {
+ butterfly.getJSON(request);
+ return true;
+ }
+
```
Then, restart OpenRefine and submit the malicious request. For example, the following `bash` command (with $' quoting) should do it:
```
curl -H 'Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8' --data $'"\\\u200d\\", Packages.java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\'gnome-calculator\')) // "' http://localhost:3333/getjsontest
```
### Impact
Any JavaScript controller that calls one of these functions is vulnerable to remote code execution.
OpenRefine itself seems unaffected; both OpenRefine and jQuery have their own functions also called parseJSON and getJSON, but those are unrelated.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.openrefine.dependencies:butterfly | < 1.2.6 | 1.2.6 | GHSA-mpcw-3j5p-p99x |