Description
### Summary: Remote Code Execution
Unsafe handling of request parameters in the RPC HTTP server results in command injection
### Details
In lib/bitcoin/rpc/http_server.rb line 30-39, the JSON body of a POST request is parsed into `command` and `args` variables. These values are then passed to `send`, which is used to call an arbitrary class method. However, there is no validation that the provided `command` value is one of the expected RPC methods.
This means that an attacker could supply a `command` value such as `system`, and then pass arbitrary system commands into the `args` parameter and achieve remote code execution.
### PoC
1. Start the RPC server
2. Send a request to the RPC server as so:
```
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18443 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"method":"eval","params":["File.write(\"/tmp/pwned\",\"owned\")"]}'
```
3. Check the /tmp folder on the machine where the RPC server is being run. If a folder /pwned now exists, the vulnerability is confirmed.
### Impact
This vulnerability would impact anyone running the RPC server. The impact is higher for those who are running it publicly exposed to the internet.
### Remediation
**Mitigating Factors:**
- The RPC server is part of the experimental SPV node feature, which is not documented and has very few users.
- The SPV-related features may be removed in future releases.
**Resolution:**
- Added whitelist validation to allow only RPC methods defined in `RequestHandler`.
- Fixed in version 1.12.0.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed | Record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RubyGems | bitcoinrb | < 1.12.0 | 1.12.0 | GHSA-q66h-m87m-j2q6 |