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masci

6 known vulnerabilities.

masci at a glance

Last 12 months
6
Critical · all time
0
Exploited · all time
0
Public exploit · all time
0
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Products

6 results · Feed

  • Medium 6.5

    Banks: User-controlled prompt input can be parsed as privileged chat messages

    Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to 2.5.0, Banks Prompt.chat_messages() attempts to parse every line of rendered template output as ChatMessage JSON. When an application renders untrusted data and passes the retur…

  • High 7.3

    Banks: Symlink traversal and arbitrary file disclosure/overwrite in DirectoryPromptRegistry

    Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to 2.5.1, Banks DirectoryPromptRegistry does not reject symbolic links for index.json or discovered and existing .jinja prompt files. In an application where untrusted users can in…

  • Medium 6.0

    Banks: Path traversal in `DirectoryPromptRegistry.set()` allows arbitrary file write outside the registry root

    Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to version 2.4.5, DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() in src/banks/registries/directory.py interpolates attacker-controlled Prompt.name and Prompt.version values into a Path without cano…

  • High 7.5

    Banks: Unsafe importlib.import_module of attacker-controlled Tool.import_path in CompletionExtension allows RCE

    Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. In versions prior to 2.4.3, banks parses Tool JSON objects from the rendered body of {% completion %} blocks and later resolves their import_path field through importlib.import_module(..…

  • High 7.5

    Banks: Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Media Filters (image/audio/video/document)

    Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. In versions prior to 2.4.4, all four media filters (image, audio, video, document) in banks accept untrusted user input as file paths via Path(value) and pass them directly to open(file_…

  • High 7.5

    Banks: Critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Jinja2 SSTI

    Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a template language that makes sense. Prior to 2.4.2, banks uses jinja2.Environment() (unsandboxed) to render prompt templates. Applications that pass user-supplied strings as the template argument to Prompt() are …